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RETAINING THE RULE OF LAW IN ACHEVRON WORLD 
MICHAEL A. FITTS* 
Few topics have engendered as much scholarly output and debate 
over the last few years as statutory construction. In the course of explor­
ing the special problems of interpretation in the administrative law con­
tent, Professor Strauss's article offers a quite original perspective on 
many of these issues. As the breadth of Strauss's discussion reveals, the 
traditional court/Congress interpretative paradigm needs to be broad­
ened in this context to account for the wide variety of institutions di­
rectly involved in the post-enactment interpretative process, including 
administrative agencies, Congressional staffs, oversight committees, and 
Presidential staff. In particular, this environment raises two special types 
of issues for the interpretative enterprise. 
First, institutional choice must be made not only between a large 
number of different institutional entities, but also in the shadow of com­
plicated informal interactions between all of these institutions, which can 
undo, or at least modify, any formal investment of authority. Although 
these informal processes are increasingly the subject of administrative 
law scholarship, in part based on public choice political science, only 
recently have we considered how this affects the process of statutory 
construction. 
Directly related to this institutional choice debate is the traditional 
concern in administrative law over vesting authority in officials who may 
be viewed as lacking democratic legitimacy- that is, in the proverbial 
headless fourth branch of government. Scholars of literary theory have, 
by illuminating the discretion inherent in the interpretative process, un­
derscored the problem of legitimacy in judicial construction. As Profes·· 
sors Rubin and Strauss have discussed, delegations to administrative 
agencies also occur through explicit as well as implicit processes-vest­
ing in unelected bureaucrats a power to interpret necessarily vague lan­
guage that might be viewed as equally, if not more, problematic than 
judicial construction. 1 
Strauss's quite thoughtful piece should be viewed, I think, as an at--
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. 
1. See Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 CoLUM. L. REv. 369 (1989); 
Strauss, Legislative Theory and the Rule of Law: Some Comments on Rubin, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 427 
( 1989). 
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tempt to confront these and other problems of interpretation in the ad­
ministrative content. Whatever the value of legislative history elsewhere, 
Strauss believes its use is necessary here to deal with the special concerns 
raised by administrative interpretation-retaining a rule of law culture in 
a politicized post New Deal state. Although I am more sympathetic to 
"politics" and "political solutions" than Strauss's "rule of law" approach 
appears to be, I ultimately agree with most of his analysis. It is impor­
tant, though, to elucidate what I take to be his underlying objectives and 
how they fit within administrative law debate-a point that is sometimes 
implicit but not explicit in his article. For this reason, my discussion will 
focus less on the pure interpretive questions that fill up much of this 
symposium, and more on administrative law questions. That is the spe­
cial insight in Strauss' piece and also, I shall argue, the best way to appre­
ciate the strengths of his arguments as well as their underlying 
assumptions. 
l. ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION 
For administrative law scholars, the fundamental debate has histori­
cally been over the inherent discretion of Executive branch officials. As 
Strauss observes, this power is a result of explicit delegations to adminis­
trative agencies, as well as the adoption of necessarily vague statutes that 
must be given operative meaning by administrative officials in a post new 
deal world. Over the years, a variety of theories have been put forward 
to rationalize the exercise of administrative discretion-hard look judi­
cial review, public participation through expanded procedures and rights 
of intervention, and bureaucratic instrumental expertise, to mention only 
a fev.;.2 
\Vithout attempting to reach any conclusion on the relative support 
for these perspectives, two new approaches, borrowing from modem 
political science, seem to have recently gained some note. In effect, each 
suggests that a different democratically elected institution can and/or 
does remain informally responsible for Executive agencies. 
The first points to Presidential oversight, via expansion of the Exec­
utive Office of the President and Executive order review, as a potential 
source for bureaucratic legitimacy. 3 The President, after all, is, iike 
members of Congress, democratically elected. Indeed, given that office's 
2. See generally Stewart, The Reformation of American Adminislrative Law. 88 HARV. L. 
REV. 1667 (l975). 
3. See Strauss & Sunstein, The Role of the President and OlYfB in Informal Ruicmaking, 38 
ADMIN. L REV. 181 (1986). 
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higher level of visibility and national focus, some have viewed the Presi­
dency as more democratic.4 Greater Presidential authority over the bu­
reaucracy, including exercise of its interpretative authority under 
Chevron,5 could make the bureaucracy popularly accountable through 
the President. Under this analysis, a series of recent legal changes in­
creasing Presidential oversight, as well as political changes possibly en­
hancing the power of the office, could be viewed as helping to alleviate 
problems of administrative legitimacy. 
Aside from the President, Congressional oversight has also been ad­
vanced as a limit on the fourth branch. An evolving political science 
literature has begun to illuminate the numerous informal ways Congress, 
especially through committee oversight, is able to exercise significant 
control over agency actions. Based on principal/agency theory, which 
outlines the informal ways principals may limit their agents, this so­
called Congressional dominance literature has suggested Congress may 
well exercise extensive control over administrative officials, through 
FOIA, GSA, public hearings, and appropriation riders. 6 At its strongest, 
some have even suggested administrative actions are explainable largely 
in terms of changing personnel and preferences of Congressional com­
mittees.7 To the extent this phenomenon occurs, we may not have a seri­
ous delegation problem, at least in the way usually claimed. The fourth 
branch is under the informal control of either a democratically elected 
Congress or President. 
Nevertheless, there are problems with these "solutions" (if you can 
call them that) to the delegation problem. The first is the potential de­
cline of the "rule of law" vvhen decisionmaking in a bureaucracy is sub­
ject on1y to informal controls. Among other things, rule of lmiV has 
traditionally meant decisionmaking subject to precedent or norms of con­
sistency. In the administrative context, this has led to public decision­
making through formulation of general laws or rules, and later their 
substantive application by different officials through a separate process, 
usually administrative adjudication or ru1emaking. The normative at­
traction of this two step process is somewhat reminiscent of Rawl's veil 
of ignorance-serving to excise some knowledge of the substantive mean-
4. ?v1ashaw, Prode!egation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, I J.L. Ecm·:. 
& 0RG 81, 95-99 (1985). 
5. Chevron lJ.S.A., Inc. v. Natural R.esources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 ( 1984). 
6. See, e.g., McCubbins, Noll, & Weingast, Administrative Procedures as !nstr..ur.ents of Polii­
ical Co111ro!, J J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 243 (1987); Fiorina, Legislator UncerTainty, Legislative Control, 
and the Defegarion of Legislative Power, 2 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 33 (1986). 
7. See, e.g., \Veingast & Moran, The jJfyth of the Runax:ay Bureaucracy, REGULATION, May­
June 1982, at 33, 37-38. 
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ing and application of general rules or decisions when they are first 
promulgated. Decisionmaking in administrative agencies through 
rulemaking followed by adjudication serves some of this need, but the 
informal processes discussed above (such as Presidential, legislative, and 
public oversight) tend not to. Indeed, these influences can exacerbate the 
problem, as political actors attempt to resolve problems at a high level of 
specificity during the implementation stage, subject to no prior 
standards. 8 
A second problem with modern delegation is the increasing and sus­
tained political divergence in party control of the Executive and legisla­
tive branches over the last thirty years. Obviously, we have long 
recognized that administrative personnel, formally the instrumental 
agents of Congress, pursue independent goals; this was the standard cri­
tique of the new deal agency captured by regulated interest groups . 9 To­
day, however, the Executive branch, if under the control of a President 
consistently from a different party than Congress, may be politically op­
posed to the substantive programs and policies it is legally charged with 
enforcing. 10 While this divergence is perhaps less likely in an era of 
strong political parties, where one party is likely to capture both 
branches, today we seem to have institutionalized an adversarial relation­
ship between the lawmaking and law applying branches. 
To the extent this is true, Presidential control may undermine the 
exercise of delegated authority, not only in the case of specific delega­
tions, but interpretative discretion as well. Executive agencies, exercising 
their Chevron discretion, will be less likely to reflect the political goals 
and tradeoffs of the Congress that originally adopted the legislation in 
the narrowly instrumental fashion that is sometimes assumed in aca­
demic debate on administrative delegation. lYioreover, any ongoing "in­
terpretative dialogue" between the branches on these issues may be less 
likely to bear fruit, let alone converge on a rough consensus. We are, 
after all, dealing with two quite distinct political parties (or to use the 
current vernacular, "interpretative communities") with potentially quite 
different perspectives on various statutory mandates. Thus, despite the 
fact that the President and Congress have many informal controls over 
the Executive branch, the concerns of delegation may not only remain; 
they may be even greater. 
8. See Fitts, Can Ignorance Be Bliss?: Imperfect Information as a Posilive Influence on Political 
Institutions, 88 MICH. L. REV. 917. 979 (1990). 
9. See, e.g., M. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION (1955). 
10. See B. GINSBERG & M. SHEFTER, POLITICS BY OTHER rJ1EANS (1990). 
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II. LEGISLATIVE HiSTORY AS A SOLUTION TO THE DELEGATION 
PROBLEM 
When all is said and done, Strauss' greatest contribution, I think, is 
in confronting and offering a potential solution responding to these two 
problems. With respect to the divided control of the Executive and legis­
lative branches, Strauss argues that legislative history will serve to shape 
and limit the discretion of the Executive branch, usually making it more 
faithful to the original enacting body. Although legislative history can 
expand the discretion of the interpreting institution, as decisionmakers 
pick and choose from the relevant history, Strauss argues, probably cor­
rectly, that it often limits discretion and ensures greater faith to the origi­
nal Congressional action. Reliance on history can be abused, but so too 
can language, which surely cannot be understood absent an understand­
ing of social context, including legislative history. 
Strauss also suggests that resort to legislative history will help rein­
troduce a modified rule of law into bureaucratic decisionmaking in the 
Chevron era. While the somewhat artificial distinction between legisla­
tive lawmaking and administrative application is enormously compli­
cated in our post new deal world, legislative history may serve a modest 
rule of law constraint-in effect, helping to give effect to the bureaucratic 
and professional norms that were embodied in the professional goals of 
those drafting the statute. Agencies which are required to interpret stat­
utes in light of these preexisting views may reflect a quasi rule of law. 
Although Strauss does not develop in detail what values the rule of law 
furthers in this context, presumably it is not simply giving effect to bu­
reaucratic <:xpertise or increasing the power of the legislative branch per 
se. Rather, it appears to be based on the value of decisionmaking made 
through previously adopted general rules or decisions. In this sense, the 
use of 1egis1ative history may not be the stuff of Hart and Sachs, but 
perhaps it is the best vve can do today, where Congress must act through 
intransitive legislation. 
Of course, this conclusion may seem counterintuitive. To some, re­
liance on legislative history should undermine the rule of law, that is, the 
need for ''law" to be in the text of the statute, which is subject to a type 
of "legislative due process," rather than in the legislative history alone. 
Judge Easterbrook, for example, has suggested that reliance on legislative 
history may contravene constitutional requirements of bicameralism and 
presentmf:nt, since the documents that make up that history do not for-
360 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW (Vol. 66:355 
mally satisfy these hurdles. 11 Strauss's claim, however, is that textual 
interpretation can create greater rule of law concerns in a Chevron world, 
since Presidents and bureaucrats will be otherwise free to construe legisla­
tion absent any preexisting historical constraints. In the informal world 
of bureaucratic politics, legislative history may be the best legislative due 
process we can have. 
This point, which is quite insightful, is critical to Strauss's contracts 
analogy, which is more complicated, I think, than it might first seem. 
Strauss argues that legislative history should also be relied upon in the 
administrative context, where agencies and Congress have repeated inter­
actions, for somewhat the same reasons that courts "liberally" construe 
contracts where parties have a continuing course of dealings. In con­
tracts law the existence of extensive dealings supposedly offers a source 
for better understanding of the parties "agreement" and how it should be 
applied and updated. Likewise, in the administrative context, it might be 
suggested, we should look beyond the formal agreement-the language 
of the legislation-to include an analysis of the outside interactions, as 
captured at least partly in the legislative history. 
There is something to this analogy, but it is ultimately persuasive 
only if understood in the context of the two delegative concerns outlined 
above, as Strauss, I think, recognizes. If we were to apply rigidly the 
rationale of the contracts literature alone, the agencies and courts would 
look not only at the legislative history (that is, relax the parole evidence 
rule), but also subsequent interactions and interpretations of the 
branches as well. By analogy to the contracts theory, the full relation­
ship between the parties, including their evolving interactions, should be 
understood in interpreting the "meaning" of their agreement. After all, 
it is this evolving relationship which justifies resort to sources outside the 
agreement. But the argument for legislative history generally seeks to 
limit updating of the agreement in light of the changing relations. 
Strauss does not want administrative officials interpreting statutes in 
light of the current relationship with the President or Congrtss; to the 
contrary, he wishes them to be bound to the full original agreements and 
understandings by expanding those "agreements" to include legislative 
history. Administrative officials are supposed to rely on legislative his­
tory in the process of resisting current pressures from the President or 
oversight committees. In this sense, the contracts literature would seem 
11. See, e.g., Easterbrook, Staiutes Domains, 50 U. 0-11. L. REV. 533, 54 7 ( 1983). See also 
Easterbrook, f.J,'har Does Legislative History Te!i Us? 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 441 ( 1990). 
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to count against the thesis.12 
This explains why the other two factors discussed above are critical 
to the argument. The desire not to update the statute is ultimately based 
on these two additional concerns-the desire to further the rule of law 
and limit the consequences of the change in "parties" (i.e., administra­
tions). Strauss's claim, I think, is that this need is especially important in 
the informal repeat player context of administrative construction because 
of the inordinate pressure to overlook the rule of law. In this network of 
informal relations, we are especially unlikely to protect such values. In 
addition, there also may be more that is valuable in that history because 
we are dealing with repeat players, engaging in communication and dia­
logue within their own community off the formal record.13 Taking all of 
these arguments together, therefore, offers a quite textured argument for 
reliance on legislative history. 
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE ARGUMENT 
The thesis, however, does raise important policy questions. Most 
importantly, as noted above, this approach could be viewed, from an­
other perspective, as undermining its primary objective-furthering the 
rule of law. Lawyers are often unclear about exactly what ends are being 
served by the "n1le of law". As a general matter, it requires acting sub­
ject to or consistent \vith previously agreed on rules or decisions, or sub­
ject to some form of due process. As a practical matter, it is sometimes 
taken simply to mean giving effect to the expertise of bureaucrats, the 
prior judgments of legislative actors, or dividing interpretative power. 
In many cases, however, the line between law and politics can be 
quite thin, with vague rule of law protections having serious political im­
plications. Legislative history, for example, can be very general, easily 
12. I don't believe Strauss would disagree with this analysis, which purports to be merely a 
restatement of his argument. At some points, however, he might be viewed as suggesting the con­
tracts iiterature independently justifies resort to legislative history. For example, he says: 
C:Jntext-both at the time of drafting and as revealed in subsequent life under the con­
tract-are essential both to accommodate the legal order to the realities of the setting in 
which contracting is going on, and to understand how the parties reasonably viewed the 
parameters of the relationship. The analogy to the problem of legislative history in the 
agency context ought to be obvious . . . Denying force to the political history of intransi· 
tive legislation is inconsistent with the reality of the setting within which legislation occurs 
and with the way in which agency and the legislature reasonably view the para:-neters of 
their relationship. 
Strauss, supra note 1, at 49-50. Taken alone, this appears to justify looking not only at legislative 
history, but also at the "subsequent life under the contract." Strauss, however, wishes to place a 
limit on such "updating," by making legislative history and text more binding. 
! 3. Though one could argue the opposite, namely, that expert drafters should be bette r  able to 
include <he relevant information in the statute. From this perspective, we should be more suspicious 
about their failure to do so. See infra. 
362 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:355 
manipulated later by executive branch officials with special career or in­
stitutional objectives. Bureaucrats may merely be furthering their per­
sonal policy by saying "We've built up a set of expectations that will 
unravel if we go that way". 14 To the extent history is buried in ambigu­
ous committee reports or internal bureaucratic memos, it can often be­
come the rationalization for a subsequent position, the method by which 
committee or bureaucratic interests are resurrected, rather than any rule 
of law limitation. 15 Because we are dealing with sophisticated repeat 
players, there may be more in those files which is relevant, but also there 
may be more potential for abuse, especially as against less sophisticated 
Presidential appointees or non-oversight committee members of Con­
gress.16 This would be especially true if the same persons who drafted 
the legislative history are the ones interpreting it. The ability to both set 
and interpret precedent may reduce any rule of law constraint.17 
Beyond the generality and malleability of some legislative history, 
there remains a question about its procedural pedigree-a traditional 
rule of law concern. In the eyes of some bureaucrats, legislative history 
includes informal "understandings" and "exchanges." Unfortunately, 
these internal memos, subcommittee testimony, and the like may be less 
subject to legislative due process-that is, public congressional scru­
tiny-than committee reports on legislation, or legislation itself. Legisla­
tion is a social, not a two person contract. 
For similar reasons, resort to legislative history may further a cer­
tain type of democratic accountability, but occasionally undermine an­
other. While legislative history may make the Executive branch more 
accountable to past legislative enactments, it may also increase the influ­
ence of the legislative committees within that branch as well as empower 
the bureaucracy vis-a-vis a recently elected President. To be sure, most 
of these legislative documents are generally available to the rest of Con­
gress and the President, who retain formal control.18 The informal un­
derstandings, however, are less likely to be scrutinized. Many scholars 
still express concern over the informal influence of the "iron-triangles", 
14. See Strauss, supra note I. 
15. Many who have served in the Executive branch (including myselt) have frequently observed 
agency officials presenting a one-sided review of the history of a program, or creating a one-sided 
history in the agency's or committee's files in the first place. 
16. To this extent, rule of law might mean requiring legislative drafters to place that informa­
tion in the statute itself, not simply in the legislative history, which can be more easily manipulated. 
17. In this sense, reliance on legislative history by agencies may be different than by courts, 
which are not involved in the initial drafting, as Strauss argues, but for reasons sometimes undermin­
ing the rule of iaw analogy. 
18. See G. Cox & M. McCuBBINS, PARTIES AND CoMMITTEES IN THE U.S. HousE OF REP­
RESENTATIVES (1989 Draft). 
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which represent the classic principal agency problem. If significant, 
these forces may gain influence by any blanket resort to legislative his­
tory or increased bureaucratic hegemony-influence against a popular 
elected President. 
This brings into focus the institutional choices implicit in this type 
of debate. Which institutions should be given greater interpretative (and 
therefore substantive) power in these various contexts: enacting Con­
gresses or committees; current Congresses or committees; current or past 
bureaucrats; current Presidents? In the aftermath of Chevron Strauss 
fears that we lean too far in favor of current Presidents, and wishes to 
invigorate past Congresses. 
If the issue is framed in such bald institutional terms, I have to con­
fess that I worry, for the reasons stated above, about the impact of any 
blanket embrace of legislative history on agency, committee and Presi­
dential influence. At least in the abstract, I am probably more sanguine 
than some others about the value of Presidential powers over the long run 
and the benefits of updating statutes in our post new deal world. 19 Lib­
eral interpretation of statutes by Presidents and their administrations can 
undermine the rule of law, as did the demise of the non-delegation doc­
trine, but also can further public and political accountability. Ov:::r th� 
years, Presidents and their administrations may be more visible and ac­
countable than administrative officials who are merely giving effect \o 
professional norms and understandings. 
In this regard, I also am concerned with the problems createc� by 
divided branches, which can be exacerbated by increased bureancratic 
hegemony. Strauss implicitly argues in favor of strengthening the reach 
of past Congresses and the permanent bureaucracy. \Nhile divisions in 
responsibility further traditional checks and balances they can also r.-md­
dle political and bureaucratic responsibility. Good law may be in tension 
with good politics at some point. Although present day liberals may be 
less disturbed by this prospect, we should remember that a modtrn 
Roosevelt or Kennedy would be subject to the same impediments. 
In light of the political implications of these issues, it might be hei:p·­
ful if we could resolve these choices subject to some constraint like a vet\ 
of ignorance, not knowing v;ho or which ideology would be emp:)wen:,:·i 
by a particular allocation. 20 Indeed, over the long run, the idecllogiud 
19. Inman & Fitts, Poiiticai Institutions and Fiscal Policy: Evidence from the U.S. i-Ji:c·ro .. ·i.-::r:!! 
Record, 6 J. L EcoN. & ORG. 79, Special Issue ( 1990); Fitts & Inman, Con!ra/ling Congres.>: Pn:si­
dential Infi'uence in Domestic Fiscal Policy, - GEO. LJ. - (forthcoming). 
20. See Fitts, supra note 8. Put another way, any rule of decision would need tc l:ie sc:i:�ect c•) 2 
long time horizon. 
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implications should balance out. Perhaps academics would be able to 
reach a greater level of agreement; at a minimum, practitioners of politics 
might be more concerned with institution building, since groups would 
be less likely to view institutions in narrowly ideological terms. Unfortu­
nately, institutions have become increasingly identified with particular 
ideologies, complicating this and other separation of powers debates. It 
is to Strauss's credit that he notes the political implications of these 
choices, but ultimately seeks to resolve his institutional recommenda­
tions, as I try to do, in broader social principles. 
In the end, though, all of these concerns are grounds only for read­
ing legislative history with greater care, not for ignoring it altogether. 
Remaining sensitive to the processes by which legislative history is gener­
ated can minimize abuse, without throwing the baby out with the 
bathwater. There are iron triangles and strategic players operating in 
·washington, but there are also hardworking bureaucrats attempting to 
confront difficult problems in a state, as they say, of "imperfect 
information". 
When all is said and done, much of our skepticism of legislative 
history is predicated on a strategic model of self-interested actors slipping 
material into law without popular review or acceptance. If one adopts 
the popular zero transaction cost, self-interest paradigm, this analysis has 
some appeal. Indeed, it is almost tautological: Why would anything re­
main in the legislative history unless its proponents feared their inability 
to gain its acceptance from the rest of Congress and the President? 
In most cases, however, the ambiguities in statutes are not strategic; 
the failure to elucidate an objective is usually a mistake in foresight or a 
reflection of informal bureaucratic norms, not of political manipulation. 
With regard to many matters of interpretation, the bureaucracy and rele­
vant committees of Congress are part of a relatively consensual commu­
nity. In these cases, resort to legislative history is more likely to further 
the rule of law, in the sense described above, than the rule of bureaucratic 
politics. Even though I might rate the risk, and the need for vigilance in 
reading that history, higher than some others, 21 in the end I agree with 
Professor Strauss that it would be folly to deprive interpreters of its 
insights. 
2!. See Fitts, The Vices of Virtue: A Political Party Perspective on Civic Viriue Reforms of the 
Legislative Process, l 36 U. PA. L REv. !567, 160 l (1988). 
